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ABSTRACT
Network device syslogs are ubiquitous and abundant in mod-
ern data centers with most large data centers producing mil-
lions of messages per day. Yet, the operational informa-
tion reflected in syslogs and their implications on diagno-
sis or management tasks are poorly understood. Prevalent
approaches to understanding syslogs focus on simple cor-
relation and abnormality detection and are often limited to
detection providing little insight towards diagnosis and res-
olution.
Towards improving data center operations, we propose
and implement Log-Prophet, a system that applies a toolbox
of statistical techniques and domain specific models to mine
detailed diagnoses. Log-Prophet infers causal relationships
between syslog lines and constructs succinct but valuable
problem graphs, summarizing root causes and their local-
ity, including cascading problems. We validate Log-Prophet
using problem tickets and through operator interviews. To
demonstrate the strength of Log-Prophet, we perform an ini-
tial longitudinal study of a large online service provider’s
data center. Our study demonstrates that Log-Prophet sig-
nificantly reduces the number of alerts while highlighting
interesting operational issues.
1. INTRODUCTION
The performance of a content provider, and ulti-
mately its revenue stream, is tied to the performance
of its data center networks. Recognizing this trend, the
networking community has proposed a number of ar-
chitectures, frameworks and protocols to improve data
center performance [8], and to diagnose reliability and
performance problems [22, 2, 8]. Recent efforts on di-
agnosing data center problems have focused on using
problem tickets [22] and host counters [33]. Surpris-
ingly, network device syslogs, which have proved invalu-
able for diagnosing problems in ISP networks [28, 29,
15], have remained largely ignored in the data center
space. Most notably, works focused on using syslogs
to quantify and characterize physical failures [21, 19, 7,
20]. Instead of syslogs, other have used packet traces,
SNMP, and ICMP to detect and diagnose problems;
however, while highly powerful in detecting problems,
these techniques often provide minimal aide in problem
resolution.
We argue that syslogs, unlike most other readily avail-
able management data (e.g. SNMP, pings, traceroutes),
are imbued with sufficient information to not only diag-
nose problems but also to expedite problem resolution
by highlighting critical properties of the problem. De-
spite their potential benefits, syslogs have been ignored
because they lack structure (free form text), lack ho-
mogeneity (they differ across vendors and even for a
vendor, they may differ across firmware versions), and
lack global causality semantics that are necessary for
diagnosis (information identifying causal relationships
between a haystack of messages).
Current approaches to log analysis are inappropriate
for syslogs for the following reasons. First, many require
access to source code [31, 34]. Unfortunately, network
devices run closed source, proprietary OSes. 1 Second,
blackbox techniques [17, 13] employ simple correlation
limiting their applicability and reducing accuracy.
In this work, we take the first step towards building
a general log analysis framework that has two goals:
(1) localize problems in the network (including prob-
lems that cascade between devices and protocol stack
layers), and (2) diagnose root causes of problems (i.e.,
sequence of cascading events that caused the problem).
Our system, Log-Prophet, aids operators by generating
a structured representation of each problem: a causal
graph of the cascading set of events (in unstructured
syslogs). Log-Prophet mines causality in syslogs to gen-
erate this output, also called Problem Graphs (PGs).
Our work builds on two insights. First, in data centers
there is an abundance of logs that naturally lend them-
selves to statistical techniques. Second, network devices
run networking protocols which dictate how problems
propage through the network: models of these protocols
can be used to guide our statistical techniques, signifi-
cantly improving problem troubleshooting.
Our goal is to extract from a stream of syslog mes-
sages, a set of accurate and precise PGs that enables
1We note that even SDN capable devices come as closed
source entities.
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network operators to more readily answer, diagnosis,
and resolve questions. In this paper we take a first step
towards this goal, by presenting: a prototype of Log-
Prophet; running the prototype on seven months worth
of production syslog data from a large-scale data cen-
ter network; and presenting a longitudinal study of the
PGs discovered in the data center.
Our key contributions are:
• Log-Prophet: The design of a log analysis frame-
work for data center networks that leverages do-
main knowledge and statistical technique to build
problem graphs (PGs) (Section 4).
• Prototype System: A prototype implementa-
tion of Log-Prophet allowing us to validate our
design and explore its benefits. (Section 5)
• Study of PGs in a large Data center: An ini-
tial analysis of the PGs generated by the data cen-
ter of a large online service problem over a seven
month period. We observe several interesting pat-
terns about the PGs generated by devices in dif-
ferent layers of the data center (Section 6).
2. RELATED WORK
Log (and Syslog) Analysis. Previous studies
of Syslog have focused on either understanding fail-
ures [21, 19, 7, 20, 28, 29], using syslogs as input to
a machine learning algorithm for diagnosis [15], or de-
veloping techniques to extract structure from the sys-
logs [32, 23]. Our current study builds on existing ap-
proaches [32, 23] and leverages their techniques to struc-
ture the data enabling us to perform a wide range of
analysis. Our analysis enriches existing work [21, 19,
7, 20, 28, 29] that focus on link and device failures by
exploring the implications of causality between syslogs.
Orthogonal attempts to mine general system logs for
diagnosis data often rely on access to source code [31,
34]. Unfortunately, most data center switches are closed
source and thus we are unable to apply these techniques.
Statistical-based Problem Diagnosis Our ap-
proaches builds on correlation and causality, similarly
other approaches have leveraged statical analysis to
learn causal relationships or dependency graph from
network data [12, 13, 14, 27, 11, 9, 30, 17]. We explore
a different set of data sources with different features,
which requires different models; for example, domain
models to introduce structure and domain models to
improve speed and accuracy of statistical techniques.
Distributed Tracing Distributed tracing [1, 3, 6,
25] has long been used in distributed systems as a way
of building program graphs and using them to detect
problems and their root causes. Unlike the RPC calls
in distributed systems that include either accurate time,
unique IDs that allow for tracing across devices, causal-
ity, or some combination, syslogs lack this information.
Specifically, there is no direct way to understand prop-
agation of events across devices. To overcome this, we
apply statistical techniques, guided by statistical tech-
niques, to infer causality within and across devices.
3. DATA AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we present an overview of our datasets
and the data center network’s operational patterns.
3.1 Data
We collected seven months worth of syslog data from
one of Yahoo’s data centers. At a high-level, the
data center network is a fat-tree topology consisting of
three device layers (traversing bottom-up): Top of Rack
(ToR) switches, two aggregation layers and a core layer.
In addition, the data center includes middleboxes serv-
ing specialized functionality. We note that this general
data center structure aligns with the set of data centers
studied in the prior work [4, 10, 21, 19, 7, 20].
In Table 1, we describe the properties of these devices,
focusing on their relative quantity, and summarizing the
type and amount of data collected from each type of de-
vice. Unsurprisingly, we observe that the data center is
dominated by edge or ToR switches. Interestingly, we
observe a large amount of device heterogeneity: essen-
tially there is heterogeneity at each layer of the data
center with each layer consisting of devices from multi-
ple vendors.
Network syslog messages (syslogs). syslogs are de-
bugging messages about events and are generated by
network devices to aid network operators in diagnosing
network anomalies and in verifying the impact of main-
tenance operations. They capture a variety of network
events ranging from failed user logins and problems with
routing protocols to interface failures and CPU over-
heating. These messages are free-form text – essentially
raw and unstructured.
The network devices are configured to push syslogs
to one of several collection servers. We collect daily
snapshots from these servers and aggregated these logs
to develop our corpus. To analyze the data, we process
syslogs to impose structure and enable diagnosis (we
discuss the processing steps in Section 6).
Configuration. We collect nightly snapshots of de-
vice configurations, both static and device runtime out-
puts. We use a configuration management system that
automatically captures these nightly snapshots. These
configurations are instrumental in determining if obser-
vations within the syslog are due to transient changes or
permanent changes. Moreover, the configuration allows
us to reconstruct the topology and determine device and
protocol adjacencies.
3.2 Domain-Specific Models
Log-Prophet builds on domain models to understand
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Device Devices Description of % of data center # of Vendors % of devices % of devices
Type devices device types with config with syslog
TOR TORA, TORB , TORC Top of Rack switches 93% > 1 100% 25.5%
MB MBA,MBB Middleboxes 2% > 1 100% 27.1%
AGG AGGA, AGGB Aggregation switches 4% > 1 100% 16.1%
CORE CORE Core routers 0.07% > 1 100% 100 %
Table 1: Overview of Dataset.
the cascading of events within and across devices. These
models are one-time inputs and do not require operator
feedback.
Protocol adjacencies. Network devices are config-
ured to run a number of protocols such as BGP, OSPF,
and MPLS. For each protocol, the device is configured
to peer with other devices that are not physically ad-
jacent. When a protocol-specific problem occurs, the
event may propagate to a device’s logical peers. When
an OSPF problem occurs on a device (e.g., OSPF pro-
cess failure), the problem will only (initially) propagate
to peers of this device (e.g. route timeouts on peers).
Motivated by this observation, we build on our prior
work [5] to parse network configurations and extend it
to model these adjacencies. For each protocol in our
data center, we create an overlay graph capturing these
adjacencies.
Physical adjacencies. Similar to protocol adjacen-
cies, problems occurring at the physical layer (layer 1)
could only propagate to physically connected devices.
We leverage network topology contained in configura-
tions to add physical adjacencies.
Protocol delays. In addition to leveraging domain
knowledge to model spatial propagation of events, Log-
Prophet also uses domain knowledge to model temporal
propagation of events across devices. Events propagate
between protocol-adjacent devices in two ways; First,
directly through the transfer of a message. For exam-
ple, the establishment of a TCP connection for a peering
session will generate syslog messages on both devices.
Second, events can propagate indirectly due to the ab-
sence of an event before a timeout, which also generates
a message. Examples of indirect propagation include
an OSPF process failure on a device, which leads to the
connection and routes on its peer to timeout several
milliseconds later. In the first, messages are simultane-
ously generated on both devices. In the second, there
is a lag between the two devices. To capture this, we
parse configuration for timeout values and use these val-
ues to bound the time taken for protocol specific events
to propagate across devices.
4. METHODOLOGY
The goal of Log-Prophet is to localize and find root
causes of problems across the data center network.
Some of these problems happen in parallel, especially
at large-scale; and many of the problems cascade within
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Figure 1: Diagram of Log-Prophet’s Workflow.
and between devices and across layers in protocol stack.
A key to such a diagnosis system is to output a succint
but useful representation of a problem that aids opera-
tors. We define a problem as a directed graph, whose
nodes are syslog messages (semantics) and whose edges
are causal relationships between them (i.e., cascades) –
we term this graph as a Problem Graph (PG). A PG
describes everything that happened during a problem,
starting from problems within a device and how they
propagated to other device(s). As an example, a mod-
ule failure (PHY) in a ToR device causes a link down
problem (L2) and an OSPF problem (L3) within the de-
vice, which cause an interface (L2) issue in a connected
AGG device.
In Figure 2, we present a high-level overview of Log-
Prophet’s components and the interactions between
these components. Log-Prophet consists of two classes
of components: asynchronous low-volume preprocess-
ing components which generate syslog templates and
use that syslog structure to generate a causality ma-
trix. The second, a set of online components ingest a
live data center-wide stream of syslog messages, map
them into a stream of templates, extract casual rules
from the stream, and generate PGs from the extracted
rules. The online components use relatively lightweight
methods. Decoupling the offline and online components
allows our techniques to scale to large data centers and
enables us to parallelize execution in Log-Prophet.
4.1 Extracting Structure From syslogs
Several approaches have been proposed to impose
structure on syslogs and extract “templates” from
them. Templates are defined as short structured-format
strings that succinctly describe the specific event em-
bodied in a line of syslog as well as the entities in-
volved in the event. In this study, we tried several ap-
proaches and settled on the one with the least error:
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SysDigest [24].
4.2 Causality Engine
Log-Prophet’s causality engine, Figure 2, is an of-
fline component of Log-Prophet that analyzes streams
of templates to infer causality. The output of the causal
engine is an |n× n| causality matrix M where Mij is 1
if and only if template ti has a causal impact on tj .
In networks and distributed systems, the traditional
approach for extracting causality from messages (or
logs) is to implement logical timestamps in events and
infer happens-before relationships. We could then use
semantic information in the message (or logs) to track
problems between devices. For example, Sherlock uses
IP addresses in packets to determine the flow of causal-
ity where as Mystery Machine learns causality between
RPCs based on happens-before relationships. These
methods either require precise timing information from
synchronized clocks, and/or significant instrumentation
to add information such as logical clocks to device
events. Since we cannot modify (closed source) network
devices to add instrumentation such as logical clocks
or record fine-grained timestamps, we cannot use tra-
ditional methods; further, happens-before relationships
cannot be inferred from syslogs in a large-scale network
(the needle in a haystack problem).
To address these challenges, our causality engine
leverages the fact that data centers generate millions
of events per day and are thus amenable to statisti-
cal techniques to find causality (a stronger definition
than happens-before). We apply Quasi-Experimental
Design, QED, a popular technique used by social sci-
entists to find causal relationships in data sets [26, 16].
QED is often used in the absence of traditional data
sources and controlled experiments such as A|B testing.
QED establishes a causal relationship between pairs of
templates (from same or different devices), a treatment
variable (cause), ti, and an outcome variable (effect),
tj , by using history; and accounts for confounding fac-
tors. For example, using QED we are able to affirm a
causal relationship between a link failure (treatment)
and a routing protocol outage (outcome), conditioning
for confounding factors such as device config changes,
power, firmware, and operating system. Using QED,
we are able to build a statistically significant causality
matrix M .
4.3 QED
At a high level, QED detects causality between an
independent variable X “treatment” and a dependent
variable Y “outcome” by identifying a set of “un-
treated” variables Z = z1...zn that are identical to X,
after accounting for confounding factors [26]. The key
to accurately affirming causality, lies in precisely iden-
tifying all confounding factors and asserting that X is
identical to elements of Z – this assertion allows us to
affirm that any difference in outcomes between paired
experiments on zi ⊂ Z and X is entirely due to X.
Thus to apply QED, the causality engine must take
the following steps: (1) identify dependent variables in
our data set, (2) control for a pre-defined set of con-
founding factors, (3) identify “untreated” variables for
each potential causal relationship, and (4) perform a
statistical test of relevance.
Identifying dependent variables. To identify de-
pendent variables, we leverage domain knowledge dis-
cussed in Section 3.2 to identify templates across de-
vices that may be dependent. Specifically, two tem-
plates across devices may be dependent if they have
spatial and temporal adjacencies. For templates within
a device, we also leverage happens-before relationships,
because syslog stream from a device is strictly ordered.
Once we identify the sets of potentially dependent vari-
ables we apply nonparametric correlation to ensure sta-
tistical dependence: we correlate pairs of templates and
identify two templates ti and tj as dependent if the cor-
relation value is significant (over alpha).
Identifying confounding factors. The confound-
ing factors pair templates ti and tj conditioned on ex-
ternal factors that impact ti and tj . These confounding
factors include device vendor, OS, location in data cen-
ter topology, and configuration changes. Thus for each
template ti, we identify a confounding set K = tj ...tm
such that each element tj ∈ K is correlated with ti
(Cij > alpha) and they share identical confounding fac-
tors.
Identifying untreated variables. Given the con-
founding set K an “untreated” template, tu, is a ran-
domly selected member of K.
Statistical test of relevance. Next, we compare
the untreated template, tu, and with the treated tem-
plate, ti. Using historical data, Log-Prophet performs
a hypothesis test for the null hypothesis (H0) that tt
has no impact on to and calculate the p value. Based
on the test, we affirm that tt (treatment) has a causal
impact on to (outcome).
4.4 Constructing problem graphs (PGs)
Given a causallity matrix, M , Log-Prophet can pro-
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Figure 3: Causally related template pairs and a
stream of templates are used to build a PG.
cess a stream of templates and identify pair of tem-
plates tj and ti where tj causally impacts ti (illustrated
in Figure 3). We summarize the stream as a set of PGs,
encoding a set of causally related templates.
More formally, a PG is a graph G = (V,E) with one
vertex per syslog template and directed edges between
syslog templates representing causality. A directed edge
in a PG represents a causal relationships between two
templates (or syslog lines) with the direction indicat-
ing causality. Figure 4 shows two examples of problems
from our data center (colors encode layer in protocol
stack). The left PG shows an example of a multi-layer
problem that spans AGG and ToR layers and multi-
ple layers in the protocol stack. It encodes templates
that capture a module failure template that causes a
link down template, which further triggers a spanning
tree protocol status change template, and at the time
causing a interface status change template on a peering
device. An edge from a node to itself implies that mul-
tiple, often duplicate, syslog lines are often generated
by a specific event: the edge between “LineProtocol”
and itself indicates that when LineProtocol fails, devices
generate multiple syslog lines. The right PG shows an
example of a problem within ToR devices that is an
Ethernet (L2) flapping issue.
To contruct PGs (illustrated in Figure 3), Log-
Prophet processes a stream of syslog templates online,
and divides the stream into time windows of templates
of size delta. For each window, it creates vertices for
each template and adds them into graph P . It adds a
direct edge between i ⊂ P and j ⊂ P if Mij is 1. Fi-
nally, Log-Prophet scans P for duplicate vertices x and
y such that template(x) == template(y). It merges
the nodes and preserves the directed edges. If an edge
exists between y and x, then it creates a self loop.
Broadly, when used for problem determination, the
key aspect of the PG are the edges and the roots of the
graph. The roots allows operators to determine (trace
back) potential root cause(s) and the edges enable op-
erators to understand the escalation/propagation of the
problem.
5. PROTOTYPE AND VALIDATION
We developed an initial prototype of Log-Prophet in
Figure 4: Example PGs from our data center.
Python in approximately 4000 LoCs. Our prototype
builds on the statistical libraries provided by scikit-
learn [18] for statistical analysis. We include models
for the following protocols: BGP, VLAN, and OSPF.
Validation: To validate Log-Prophet, we examined
the problem ticket database for the data center and in-
terviewed operators of our data centers. For our op-
erator interviews, we analyzed a subset of the data: 6
weeks worth of data. We presented the raw syslogs
along with the discovered PGs, and discussed the in-
formation contained within the PGs as well potential
problem tickets generated for these graphs. Our initial
results are promising – the operators agreed that the
PGs succinctly captured events within a device. For
events across devices, we were limited by the set of pro-
tocols we have currently modeled. We plan to extend
our prototype with protocol models. We are also work-
ing on a systematic validation of Log-Prophet output,
both using live data (in collaboration with network op-
erations), and an emulation testbed.
6. INITIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF
PRODUCTION PGs
In this section, we present a longitudinal analysis of
syslogs and resulting PGs for a large data center con-
sisting of over five thousand devices. In analyzing these
PGs, we aim to understand: (1) the data center’s op-
erational dynamics from the perspective of the network
devices; (2) the persistence of operations issues (as cap-
tured by PGs); and (3) the locality of operational issues
to specific types of devices or layers in the networking
stack.
6.1 Classification of PGs
In applying Log-Prophet on seven months of data,
we discovered 4264 PGs which could be easily clustered
into 156 classes: through manual inspection we were
able to classify these graphs into 22 high level types
of PGs. The manual inspection allowed us to group
together graphs consisting of templates from different
vendors – the clustering couldn’t not do this as their
graphs were included radically different templates.
We observe that applying Log-Prophet to our data
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center allows us to reduce hundreds of millions of lines
into 13 distinct PGs with each PG. We analyzed a time
series of the number of syslogs generated and compare
them against the number of instances of PGs extracted
(not shown due to space constraints). From this we
observe that while there are only 13 unique PGs in our
data center: there are in fact thousands of events occur-
ring on a daily basis. From an operational standpoint,
this is a more tractable number than the hundreds of
millions of syslogs. Furthermore, while there are thou-
sands of instances PGs they only map to thirteen unique
PGs thus problem determination and resolution will in-
volve little overhead.
Figure 5: Number of PGs for each layer.
6.2 Footprint of PGs
Next in Figure 5, we analyze the breakdown of PGs
across the different layers in the data center. There are
several interesting observations about the distribution
of graphs across data centers layers.
ToR layer dominates: Over 93% of the PGs occur
at the ToR devices. This pattern is a direct manifesta-
tion of two trends: first, over 90% of the devices in the
data center are ToR devices (See Table 1); second, ToR
devices are often cheap commodity devices with lower
quality parts and are thus prone to more failures [19,
7].
L3-L4 PGs dominate MBs: Unlike the ToR and
the AGG layers, the middlebox layer are dominated by
a combination of L4 PGs (virtual IP migration), rout-
ing PGs, and HW PGs. In the the different types of
MB only generate 2-3 graphs: for example, the load
balancer generates PGs related to: virtual IP migra-
tion (or failures); memory issues; and interface failures
creating IP unreachability.
PGs across devices: A number of interesting PGs
display problems that cross devices boundaries and even
tier boundaries. For example, we find that graphs re-
lated to interface failures in a ToR often percolate up
to affect the OSPF routing protocol in adjacent AGG
devices (illustrated in Figure 4).
Figure 6: Number of PGs for each layer.
Lastly in Figure 6, we analyze the size of a representa-
tive subset of the PGs in terms of duration (in seconds)
and length (number of messages covered). Due to space
we limit the figure to 14 representative PGs. Naturally,
there exists a diversity in the sizes of the different PG.
More interestingly, we observe that counter intuitively,
there is no direct correlation between duration and sys-
log lines capture: this indicates that simply looking at
number of syslogs is insufficient.
Takeaways: Although our results are preliminary,
the provide us with an overview of the problems with
modern data centers. We are currently working with
operators to explore methods for developing tools to au-
tomatically suppress superflous PGs; ranks PGs based
importance and scope; and to use PGs to suggestion
potential resolutions.
7. CONCLUSION
There exists a dichotomy within the community. On
one hand, a large number of studies have characterized
data center failures and performance issues using a spe-
cific set of syslog messages (i.e. interface failures). On
the other hand, extensive work within carrier and ISP
networks have displayed the benefits of using a larger
set of syslog messages. In this work, we take the first
step towards reconciling this dichotomy by developing
Log-Prophet, a system for analyzing syslog messages
and extracting problem graphs that summarize causal-
ity within the data center. We have validated Log-
Prophet with network operators and applied to an ini-
tial data center. Our initial analysis are promising and
they show that there is a strong benefit in employing
frameworks such as Log-Prophet.
6
8. REFERENCES
[1] M. K. Aguilera, J. C. Mogul, J. L. Wiener, P. Reynolds,
and A. Muthitacharoen. Performance debugging for
distributed systems of black boxes. In ACM SIGOPS
Operating Systems Review, volume 37, pages 74–89. ACM,
2003.
[2] M. Alizadeh, A. Greenberg, D. A. Maltz, J. Padhye,
P. Patel, B. Prabhakar, S. Sengupta, and M. Sridharan.
Data center tcp (dctcp). In Proceedings of SIGCOMM,
2010.
[3] M. Attariyan, M. Chow, and J. Flinn. X-ray: Automating
root-cause diagnosis of performance anomalies in
production software. In OSDI, pages 307–320, 2012.
[4] T. Benson, A. Akella, and D. A. Maltz. Network traffic
characteristics of data centers in the wild. In Proceedings of
IMC, 2010.
[5] T. Benson, A. Akella, and A. Shaikh. Demystifying
configuration challenges and trade-offs in network-based isp
services. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011
Conference, SIGCOMM ’11, pages 302–313, New York,
NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[6] R. Fonseca, G. Porter, R. H. Katz, S. Shenker, and
I. Stoica. X-trace: A pervasive network tracing framework.
In Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on
Networked systems design & implementation, pages 20–20.
USENIX Association, 2007.
[7] P. Gill, N. Jain, and N. Nagappan. Understanding network
failures in data centers: Measurement, analysis, and
implications. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM, 2011.
[8] A. Greenberg, J. R. Hamilton, N. Jain, S. Kandula,
C. Kim, P. Lahiri, D. A. Maltz, P. Patel, and S. Sengupta.
Vl2: A scalable and flexible data center network. In
Proceedings of SIGCOMM, 2009.
[9] S. Kandula, R. Chandra, and D. Katabi. What’s going on?:
learning communication rules in edge networks. In ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, volume 38,
pages 87–98. ACM, 2008.
[10] S. Kandula, S. Sengupta, A. Greenberg, P. Patel, and
R. Chaiken. The nature of data center traffic:
Measurements & analysis. In Proceedings of IMC, 2009.
[11] R. R. Kompella, J. Yates, A. Greenberg, and A. C.
Snoeren. Ip fault localization via risk modeling. In
Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on
Networked Systems Design & Implementation-Volume 2,
pages 57–70. USENIX Association, 2005.
[12] S. S. Krishnan and R. K. Sitaraman. Video stream quality
impacts viewer behavior: inferring causality using
quasi-experimental designs. Networking, IEEE/ACM
Transactions on, 21(6):2001–2014, 2013.
[13] A. Lakhina, M. Crovella, and C. Diot. Diagnosing
network-wide traffic anomalies. In ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, volume 34, pages
219–230. ACM, 2004.
[14] A. Mahimkar, J. Yates, Y. Zhang, A. Shaikh, J. Wang,
Z. Ge, and C. T. Ee. Troubleshooting chronic conditions in
large ip networks. In Proceedings of the 2008 ACM
CoNEXT Conference, page 2. ACM, 2008.
[15] A. A. Mahimkar, H. H. Song, Z. Ge, A. Shaikh, J. Wang,
J. Yates, Y. Zhang, and J. Emmons. Detecting the
performance impact of upgrades in large operational
networks. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM, 2010.
[16] H. Oktay, B. J. Taylor, and D. D. Jensen. Causal discovery
in social media using quasi-experimental designs. In
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Social Media
Analytics, pages 1–9. ACM, 2010.
[17] A. J. Oliner, A. V. Kulkarni, and A. Aiken. Using
correlated surprise to infer shared influence. In DSN, pages
191–200. IEEE Computer Society, 2010.
[18] F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel,
B. Thirion, O. Grisel, M. Blondel, P. Prettenhofer,
R. Weiss, V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Passos,
D. Cournapeau, M. Brucher, M. Perrot, and E. Duchesnay.
Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python. Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 12:2825–2830, 2011.
[19] R. Potharaju and N. Jain. Demystifying the dark side of
the middle: A field study of middlebox failures in
datacenters. In Proceedings of IMC, 2013.
[20] R. Potharaju and N. Jain. An empirical analysis of intra-
and inter-datacenter network failures for geo-distributed
services. In Proceedings of SIGMETRICS, 2013.
[21] R. Potharaju and N. Jain. When the network crumbles: An
empirical study of cloud network failures and their impact
on services. In Proceedings of SoCC, 2013.
[22] R. Potharaju, N. Jain, and C. Nita-Rotaru. Juggling the
jigsaw: Towards automated problem inference from
network trouble tickets. In Proceedings of nsdi, 2013.
[23] T. Qiu, Z. Ge, D. Pei, J. Wang, and J. Xu. What happened
in my network: Mining network events from router syslogs.
In Proceedings of IMC, 2010.
[24] T. Qiu, Z. Ge, D. Pei, J. Wang, and J. Xu. What happened
in my network: Mining network events from router syslogs.
In Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on
Internet Measurement, IMC ’10, pages 472–484, New York,
NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[25] P. Reynolds, C. E. Killian, J. L. Wiener, J. C. Mogul,
M. A. Shah, and A. Vahdat. Pip: Detecting the unexpected
in distributed systems. In NSDI, volume 6, pages 115–128,
2006.
[26] W. R. Shadish, T. D. Cook, and D. T. Campbell.
Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for
generalized causal inference. Wadsworth Cengage learning,
2002.
[27] M. Tariq, A. Zeitoun, V. Valancius, N. Feamster, and
M. Ammar. Answering what-if deployment and
configuration questions with wise. In ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, volume 38, pages
99–110. ACM, 2008.
[28] D. Turner, K. Levchenko, S. Savage, and A. C. Snoeren. A
comparison of syslog and is-is for network failure analysis.
In Proceedings of IMC, 2013.
[29] D. Turner, K. Levchenko, A. C. Snoeren, and S. Savage.
California fault lines: Understanding the causes and impact
of network failures. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM, 2010.
[30] T. Wang, M. Srivatsa, D. Agrawal, and L. Liu. Learning,
indexing, and diagnosing network faults. In Proceedings of
the 15th ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages 857–866.
ACM, 2009.
[31] W. Xu, L. Huang, A. Fox, D. Patterson, and M. I. Jordan.
Detecting large-scale system problems by mining console
logs. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium
on Operating systems principles, pages 117–132. ACM,
2009.
[32] K. Yamanishi and Y. Maruyama. Dynamic syslog mining
for network failure monitoring. In Proceedings of KDD,
2005.
[33] M. Yu, A. Greenberg, D. Maltz, J. Rexford, L. Yuan,
S. Kandula, and C. Kim. Profiling network performance for
multi-tier data center applications. In Proceedings of NSDI,
2011.
[34] X. Zhao, Y. Zhang, D. Lion, M. F. Ullah, Y. Luo, D. Yuan,
and M. Stumm. lprof: A non-intrusive request flow profiler
for distributed systems. In 11th USENIX Symposium on
Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI 14),
pages 629–644, Broomfield, CO, Oct. 2014. USENIX
Association.
7
